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This paper discusses the problems related to assigning or denying intellectual property 
rights to biotechnological innovation, with particular reference to agro-biotechnologies 
and the relations between developed and developing countries. There are two types of 
problems to consider. First, the aim of protecting property rights on innovations is to 
create incentives towards research and innovation in general, which in some cases may 
be beneficial to society, in others not so. If the assignment of an intellectual property 
right does not guarantee the potential beneficial use of new knowledge, not assigning 
rights would not prevent its potentially dangerous utilization. Secondly, the holder of an 
intellectual property right has a power of exclusion which limits access by others to the 
newly produced knowledge. However, the production of new knowledge is very often a 
process which starts from a base of existing knowledge. Hence, discouraging access to 
existing knowledge also means discouraging the process of producing new knowledge. 
Paradoxically then, in protecting intellectual property we obtain the opposite result to 
the one expected and desired. Moreover, the holder of an intellectual property right may 
end up with excessive market power when commercializing the innovation. This paper 
will try to show that these problems cannot be solved, as sometimes is suggested, by 
denying protection of property rights on innovations, but by improving the procedures 
for awarding these rights and accompanying them with other measures such as liability 
rules governing potential damage and also antitrust measures.  
 
Keywords: Intellectual property rights, Biotechnology, Patent system 









Address for correspondence: 
 
Ignazio Musu 
Department of Economics 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta S.Giobbe 
30121 Venezia 
Italy 
Phone: 041 2349151 
Fax: 041 2349176 
E-mail: musu@unive.it 
   1
1. Introduction 
 
Traditionally, intellectual property rights have been considered to be the  “natural” right 
of the inventor, to be protected in order to prevent others stealing the fruits of the 
inventor’s research efforts. This vision is often countered by an opposing one, which 
considers it inappropriate to assign private property rights to intellectual creations, 
since, the argument  goes,  knowledge is a public good which should be freely available 
to everybody for the well-being of human society as a whole. 
 
Recently, protection of intellectual property rights on new knowledge has been 
advocated as the best means to promote technological progress. The starting point of the 
argument is that once knowledge has been produced, it can be utilized by everybody at a 
very low marginal cost. If we consider that the costs of  obtaining existing knowledge 
are “sunk”, and acceding  to new knowledge entails paying a price equal to the marginal 
cost of knowledge utilization, this price would not adequately reward the costs of 
producing new knowledge in the future. Knowing that any future research efforts would 
not guarantee appropriate returns will undoubtedly discourage such efforts.  
 
Price incentives are not the only type that encourage efforts to obtain new knowledge: 
there are others, such as personal satisfaction, the vocational calling to research, social 
recognition through reward, recognition and academic career advancement. But price 
incentives are important, and they can be provided by awarding rights to the intellectual 
property of new knowledge.   
 
Assigning a property right to a producer of new knowledge excludes others from 
utilizing it unless they obtain a license from the right holder, obviously at a price. This 
price must be higher than the marginal cost of utilizing the produced knowledge and 
high enough to be perceived as an incentive to produce new knowledge (Maskus, 2000; 
Posner and Landes, 2003).  
 
Basically, there are two types of problems to consider. First, the aim of protecting 
property rights on innovations is to create incentives towards research and innovation in 
general; the risk is that this may give vent to socially dangerous innovations.  However,   2
in most cases it is not easy to establish whether or not an innovation is beneficial or 
dangerous, especially because it may be subsequently utilized in many ways, some of 
which may be beneficial to society, others not so. In this case, if the assignment of an 
intellectual property right does not guarantee the potential beneficial use of new 
knowledge, not assigning rights would not prevent its potentially dangerous utilization.    
 
Secondly, the holder of an intellectual property right has a power of exclusion which 
limits access by others to the newly produced knowledge. However, the production of 
new knowledge is very often a process which starts from a base of existing knowledge. 
Hence, discouraging access to existing knowledge also means discouraging the process 
of producing new knowledge. Paradoxically then, in protecting intellectual property we 
obtain the opposite result to the one expected and desired. Moreover, the holder of an 
intellectual property right may end up with excessive market power when 
commercializing the innovation.  
 
Applied to biotechnological innovations, these two types of problems emerge in all their 
complexity, involving in particular relations between developed and developing 
countries. They will be discussed in the following sections, with particular reference to 
agro-biotechnologies. I will try to show that these problems cannot be solved, as 
sometimes is suggested, by denying protection of property rights on innovations, but by 
improving the procedures for awarding these rights and accompanying them with other 
measures such as liability rules governing potential damage and also antitrust measures.  
 
2. Social costs and benefits of biotechnologies, and protection of 
intellectual property rights.        
 
Nobody doubts that biotechnology is currently one of the most important expressions of 
technological progress. As is well known, it embraces all technologies that use 
molecular and cellular biology for solving problems linked to agriculture and food, as 
well as human health. Medical biotechnology has applications both in diagnosis and in 
producing new drugs. Biotechnologies applied to agriculture are used for producing and 
modifying plants, animals and micro-organisms. Plants and animals have been modified   3
for the benefit of humankind for hundreds of years using conventional methods, such as 
grafting and selective breeding; biotechnology has now introduced an unprecedented 
qualitative change by enabling human beings to transfer genes from one species to 
another. 
 
A debate is developing on the social benefits and costs of biotechnologies, with extreme 
opposite positions emerging: on the one hand, unconditional optimists maintain the 
widespread belief that technological progress in biotechnologies is always good and 
should be given free  rein to develop; on the other hand, unconditional pessimists 
consider any biotechnological innovation dangerous simply because it is the result of 
unnatural human intervention in natural life processes. 
 
These extreme positions are rooted in the premise that general brad-ranging 
propositions will be valid for any type of biotechnological innovation. This is simply 
not the case because the social benefits of some biotechnologies are likely to be greater 
than their social costs; for others, the opposite is likely to be the case. This is something 
not always easy to establish due to the high level of uncertainty resulting from a lack of 
scientific knowledge and the fact that most effects of the innovations will only become 
apparent in a  distant future. What should be done is to improve scientific knowledge by 
helping to better understand the effects of innovations and to use  institutional channels 
to encourage those innovations which promise to be more beneficial and less risky to 
society. 
 
The most commonly recognized benefits of biotechnological innovations are in resource 
productivity, considered both in terms of higher output per unit of primary resources 
and in a higher variety of outputs. In the case of medical biotechnologies, the most 
important benefits concern the second point: for instance, production of proteins for 
curing and preventing diseases, and  therapeutic applications of research using in vitro 
cultivation of stem cells. In the case of agricultural biotechnologies, the most important 
benefits concern both aspects: increase in crops’ yields through better plant resistance to 
adverse factors, and the possibility of producing new plant varieties.  
   4
The risks and costs of biotechnologies concern their effects on the environment  and 
consequently on human health. Consider as an example herbicide-resistant GM plants. 
Herbicides contained in plants directly and indirectly enter the food chain, and can 
damage human health. Water sources are also polluted when herbicides are discharged 
into them.  Reducing the first type of negative effects, herbicide-resistant GM plants 
appears to be beneficial to society. But the introduction of such an innovation is 
unlikely to reduce the use of herbicides; on the contrary, farmers are likely to use more 
herbicides to destroy weeds, as they are less concerned about the damage produced in 
the plants they grow.  
 
Moreover, herbicide-resistant genes can cross over to other plants, including the weeds 
that should be destroyed; the risk here is that the creation of “superweeds” would entail 
searching for more powerful and possibly more risky herbicides. GM plants could 
themselves begin behaving like weeds if their new, superior genetic characteristics give 
them a comparative advantage over neighboring wild species (Dutfield, 2004, p.63). 
 
Pest-resistant GM plants are another example of agro-biotechnological innovation. They 
should lead to a reduction in the use of pesticides. However, attention should be given 
to nature’s reaction to neutralize human intervention by selecting the most resistant 
elements in the population concerned (Goeschel and Swanson, 2002, 2003, 2004). The 
defensive reaction of pests could  lead to the emergence of “super-pests”, the 
development of which is likely to encourage the invention of new GM plants resistant to 
the new types of “super-pests” or, if research is unable to find them, more powerful and 
potentially dangerous pesticides may be used. 
 
An important and much-debated effect of biotechnologies on the environment is on 
biodiversity. Biodiversity refers to the variety of biological species in a given 
ecosystem, necessary for its functioning. It is eventually determined by the stock of 
genetic material found in the ecosystem itself. Biodiversity should be preserved because 
of its information value and because of its insurance value (Swanson, 1997). 
Biodiversity is the result of the whole history of evolution, and offers an irreplaceable 
corpus of information on the possible directions which biological activity might take.   5
This information must be screened in order to be utilized. Scientific research is 
essential, but the screening process  can  also be improved by using “traditional 
knowledge” gathered by human communities in their interaction with the environment. 
Biodiversity also has an insurance value, because it ensures smoother adjustment to the   
negative shocks suffered by an ecosystem. In biological terms, we might say that a 
highly diversified ecological system increases its resilience to shocks; in economic 
terms, we can say that a rich portfolio of biological activities reduces the variability of 
their returns and the risk implicit to the biological structure. 
 
Some believe that biotechnological innovations are a threat to the maintenance of 
biodiversity, since they represent a typical form of technological progress that 
substitutes natural capital with artificial capital, leading to an increase in biological 
specialization. Others, on the contrary, believe that biotechnology can help maintain and 
possibly increase  biodiversity since, through biotechnology, it is possible to transfer 
successful biological strategies between species and thus to obviate the erosion of 
genetic stock that may result from biological specialization.   
 
The obvious question now is the following: how can society ensure that the protection 
of intellectual property rights, by promoting innovations unconditionally, does not lead 
to the introduction of excessively risky and socially dangerous biotechnological 
innovations? 
 
The most frequently used mode of protection for intellectual property rights on 
innovations are patents. In principle, it is possible to prevent patenting socially 
dangerous innovations. This provision is made clear in the Trade Related International 
Property System Agreement (TRIPS agreement),  incorporated into the World Trade 
Organization agreements. According to article 27.3b, inventions contrary to public order 
or to ethics, or dangerous for the health of humans, the life of animals and plants, or 
environmentally dangerous, can be denied patents. However art. 27.3b specifies that 
countries cannot deny patents for microbiological processes, and this amounts in 
practice to excluding a selective patentability for biotechnological innovations. No   6
surprise that this specification has been strongly criticized by those opposed to awarding 
patents to biotechnological innovations (Shiva, 2001).  
 
Opponents of patenting biotechnological innovations invoke the precautionary 
principle. Their argument is that when there is any uncertainty regarding the effects of 
the innovation on the environment and on health, the innovation should be blocked, 
until research and science provide more information. This is precisely the case with 
biotechnological innovations. The problem with the precautionary principle lies in 
interpreting  the requirement that uncertain effects should be absent. There is the risk 
that if the precautionary principle is always invoked, there will be no innovation at all. 
To prevent this from happening, a probabilistic formulation of the principle should be 
adopted, requiring that the probability of negative effects is shown to be sufficiently 
low. 
 
A recent example of a wise application of the precautionary principle is the Cartagena 
Protocol on biological safety required by article 19.3 of the Biodiversity Convention. In 
articles 10 and 11, the Cartagena Protocol explicitly refers to the principle of precaution, 
as the basis on which a country should adopt restrictive measures against LMO imports, 
whenever there is insufficient scientific information on the product’s potentially 
hazardous effects. Although this example does not refer to patentability, it is useful as a 
constructive application of the precautionary principle, as it suggests that, before taking 
trade restrictive measures, every effort should be made to identify and appropriately 
assess the potential risks and decide whether or not any restrictions ought to be placed 
on developing the product. It should be noted that no contradiction exists with the WTO 
agreements, as GATT article XX envisages that certain measures are justified when 
necessary, in order to protect the life and health of humans, animals and plants, and to 
preserve natural resources.  
 
An important aspect to be considered is that awarding a patent does not automatically 
and unconditionally imply the right to transform an innovation into a product or a 
commercial process. Commercial potential is a condition for awarding a patent, but that 
does not mean that commercial use is automatically permitted. This will depend on   7
legislation and will  reflect a society’s ethical values in determining the conditions for a 
socially efficient commercial application of a patented innovation (Di Cataldo, 2003). 
 
Moreover, it is important to realize that negative effects are not necessarily avoided by 
prohibiting patents, as this does not imply that an innovation will not be introduced and 
marketed. Without an explicit and enforceable prohibition to the introduction and 
diffusion of a product, biotechnological innovations, as any innovation, can be 
developed and introduced without patents. In doing so,  potential negative effects are 
often concealed. Thus, paradoxically, if an invention is introduced and diffused without 
a patent being first awarded, the risk for human health and the environment can be 
higher. 
  
Rather than adopting a general strategy of denying patents a priori, it seems more useful 
to qualify the procedure for awarding them and to accompany patents with other 
measures. Alterations to patenting procedures should aim to carefully specify the 
characteristics of the product or process to be patented, and to take account of its 
potential effects on the biological world, on the environment and on human health.  
 
Patents as a tool for stimulating innovations should be accompanied by efficient liability 
systems. Knowing that someone who introduces a hazardous innovation will be held 
liable for any related damage, particularly if knowledge about this damage was 
concealed, is a clear disincentive for not revealing all the potential known 
consequences.  
3. Intellectual property rights on biotechnologies and excessive 
exclusion  power: a tragedy of anti-commons. 
 
Protection of the intellectual property rights on an innovation always assigns a power of 
exclusion. There are two consequences to consider: one concerns the use of the 
innovation for further research; the other is the restrictions in the use of the innovation 
for commercial purposes. In the first case, the excessive power of exclusion assigned to 
a right holder may prevent rather than promote the production of new knowledge, 
giving rise to a “tragedy of anti-commons” (Heller, 1998; Colangelo, 2004) as opposed   8
to the “tragedy of commons” which occurs when there is open and free access to 
produced knowledge, leading to a lack of incentives to undertake efforts to create new 
knowledge.  
 
The problem cannot be solved by denying patentability, but should rather be addressed 
by altering rules for procedures. Consider the example of decoding genes or gene 
sequences. An objection against patentability is that decoding is not an invention, but a 
discovery of something existing in nature. This objection does not convince because the 
novelty in this case lies not in what has been discovered, but in the fact that this is being 
presented in such a way that makes further utilization possible.   
 
Another aspect of  patentability should be mentioned. If patenting decoding means 
assigning the patent holder an exclusion right on any possible use of the decoded gene 
or sequence, the risk of preventing the development of further research is evident. The 
excessive exclusion power derives from the fact that decoding by itself cannot be 
immediately associated with a specific function; it will have many different potential 
uses. This is why the US Patent Office only grants patents of decoded sequences if 
applications  specify which protein the sequences codify, or in the case of virus genome 
decoding, if patent applications specify the function of diagnosing a specific illness and 
therefore of finding a suitable vaccine. In other words, patenting covers the discovery 
only in relation to a specific application that must be indicated. This means that the 
owner of the patent can use property rights towards others wanting to use the gene or 
sequence, only for the specific use described in the patent application. Notice that in this 
way the patenting procedure can also ensure that patents do not create conditions for 
excessively risky and socially dangerous innovations. 
 
Consider now the first stage of the production process of genetic material, such as genes 
or DNA sequences reproduced and proteins encoded from sequences using genetic 
engineering techniques i.e. DNA recombining techniques. In this case too, the objection 
raised against patentability is that the process obtains something already existing in 
nature. This objection can be countered by using the former argument; moreover, the   9
example can be cited of the recognized patentability of chemical substances existing in 
nature and obtained through synthetic processes.  
 
In this case, exclusion power also allows  the patent holder of the technique to extend 
the patent’s right to all the products obtained through that technique. This clearly 
discourages further research. The solution, even in this case, is not to deny granting a 
patent for the technique, but to acknowledge the right to patenting different products 
obtained with that same technique, and recognizing the novelty of the intellectual 
process which uses the technique to obtain the new product. Likewise, the patent holder 
of a new product should not have a right of exclusion towards innovations that obtain 
the same product through different techniques. 
 
Moreover, to ensure that research is not negatively affected, the holder of a patent on 
decoding a genetic sequence or on a biotechnology for producing a genetic product 
should not have the right to prevent the use of the gene in its natural form for further 
applications (Correa, 2000, p.181). 
 
To avoid a scenario in which patents interfere with and impede further research 
development,  exceptions can be made for the granting of exclusive rights to the patent 
holder if these exceptions relate to scientific experiments derived from the invention. 
For example, scientific experiments on genetic material samples that were deposited 
together with the patent application. A case in point at international level is the network 
of International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs), which is supported by the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) that together hold 
the world’s largest ex-situ collection of plant genetic resources. These resources are 
considered as an international public good and hence they are made available to 
researchers in every part of the world and all adhere to the restriction that no intellectual 
property right protection may be sought on material received from the IARCs. 
   
One tool used to encourage access to research is the authorization to use a patent 
without the patent holder's own authorization (compulsory licences). Compulsory 
licenses are permitted by the TRIPS agreement in cases where  it is in the public   10
interest, if the invention isn't being used sufficiently, or if the patent holder applies 
anticompetitive practices that hinder access. They also stimulate research aimed at 
conserving and protecting the environment.  
 
The creation of patent pools has been suggested as a way of overcoming  the problem of 
excessive transaction costs deriving from research activity and from protection of 
intellectual property. These are institutions that coordinate the exchange of patents for 
complementary and related innovations, deal with controversies, and exchange 
information useful for further research (Colangelo, 2004). 
 
The effects of limitations on  research from patenting biotechnological innovations can 
be particularly damaging for developing countries, because of their lack of scientific, 
technological and entrepreneurial capabilities and their inadequate financial means. 
 
The Biodiversity Convention encourages each nation to develop scientific research on 
genetic resources provided by developing countries with their full participation (art.15), 
favoring access to the technologies that use these resources, including those protected 
by patents and other intellectual property rights (art.16) and the creation of structures 
and mechanisms to develop research in the countries where genetic resources are 
located (art.9). The Convention also requires that developed nations put financial 
resources at the disposal of developing countries so that they can fully sustain the 
necessary additional costs, based on a common agreement (art.20).  
 
The 2001 FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources introduces a 
Multilateral System in order to facilitate access to genetic resources (art.10) without 
cost, or at a minimum cost, in particular for purposes of research (art.12). Access to 
information should always be allowed and those who have benefited from it should not 
be granted intellectual property rights or other rights that could limit the further 
diffusion of resources. 
 
   11
4. Intellectual property rights on biotechnology and excessive market 
power. 
 
The second consequence of assigning excessive exclusion power to a patent holder is 
the possibly excessive market power enjoyed when the biotechnological innovation is 
marketed.  This becomes a problem when the innovation is recognized as socially 
beneficial, so that it is in society’s interest that the innovation is quickly diffused. The 
conflict derives from the objective need for a low price, while the patent keeps it at too 
high a level. A problem of equity can arise, as in the case of new drugs considered 
essential to cure serious and widespread illnesses, when those who require them do not 
have the income to afford the expenditures imposed by the high price resulting from the 
protection of intellectual property. 
 
The problem does not only occur with biotechnological innovations. One way to deal 
with it could be to act selectively regarding the duration of the patent. This is not a 
particularly advisable solution, as in setting the optimal duration of a patent, current 
consumers’ welfare losses from monopolistic pricing should be compared to future 
benefits for consumers deriving from the stream of innovation stimulated by the patent, 
and these future benefits are extremely difficult to quantify.    
 
The most advisable way to address this problem is healthy competition in research 
activity for inventions. It is true that the patent imposes entry barriers, but it is also true 
that this stimulates the drive to innovate which overcomes these entry barriers through 
the development of new products and techniques to be patented. This is a typical 
application of the so called “Schumpeterian destructive creation” process, when the new 
inventor is able to crowd out the old one (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). What should be 
noted is that there is a relationship between reducing exclusion power from research and 
reducing monopolistic power. It also emerges that procedural rules that ensure 
patentability of new techniques to produce an existing product as well as of new 
products obtained by the same technique, are not only as a means to reduce excessive 
exclusion power from research, but also excessive market power associated with the 
patent.      12
 
To better understand this point, consider the example of the so-called GURTs (Genetic 
Use Restriction Technologies) whose most recent version, known as “terminator 
technology” renders harvested seeds sterile and obliges farmers to re-buy the seeds from 
the producer of the genetic innovation (Swanson, 2002). The “terminator technology” 
has been jointly developed by the US Department of Agriculture and a major American 
cotton seed producing company (Delta and Pine Land), and the patent was jointly 
granted to both. The effect was quite simply to increase the value of seed owned by the 
US company and to open new markets, especially in developing countries (Dutfield, 
2004, p.77). It has been argued that the excessive market power comes from the fact that  
farmers are forced to buy their seeds from the same producer. But this is not the true 
reason. The power derives from the monopolistic position of the seeds’ producer. With 
alternative “terminator technologies” available, farmers would have a choice, and the 
market power would be reduced. Within an appropriate regulatory framework, patents 
could provide the incentive for further research and achieve more competitiveness.   
 
To address the problem of equity, society should perhaps decide to incur at least part of 
the cost that consumers of the patented product or final users of patented processes pay 
as the patent’s rent, thus allowing those who need the patented product or process to 
buy it at a price they can afford. This can be obtained at a national level by means of a 
redistributive  fiscal policy, and at an international level by means of conditional 
transfers from rich to poor countries.  
 
In biotechnologies, there are examples of market power that can be explicitly addressed 
with antitrust measures rather than with measures acting on patent procedures. Here is 
an often cited case. Montsanto had made huge profits from its own patented herbicide 
Roundup. Concerned with the shortfalls of profits following the patent’s expiration, 
Montansto developed and patented GM seeds containing a gene resistant to Roundup. 
However, the company contractually obliged farmers to buy these Roundup Ready 
seeds together with the patented herbicide. Montsanto denied that its objective was to 
increase the use of herbicides, but conceded that its main interest was to ensure that 
farmers continued to use its own herbicides (Dutfield, 2004, p.63). This case typically   13
reveals the existence of a market power problem linked to protection of intellectual 
property granted by the patent that should be dealt with by antitrust authorities rather 
than by patent procedures or by patent awarding authorities. 
 
 
5. Patenting biotechnologies and the distribution of benefits to 
developing countries. 
 
Developing countries claim that the distribution of benefits from commercializing 
patented innovations obtained in developed countries ignores the role of many 
developing countries as suppliers of genetic resources (the raw materials) for 
biotechnological innovations. They demand that this role be recognized by 
redistributing at least a part of the innovation rents to them.  
 
They also accuse the present patent system of being organized in such a way that returns 
are only recognized to the final innovation phase, i.e. for  companies in developed 
countries. What they demand is that protection mechanisms for property rights be 
revised so as to explicitly recognize the role of the initial phase of the entire 
biotechnological innovation process, which involves the supply of primary genetic 
resources and biodiversity, and the contribution of the traditional knowledge of 
indigenous communities and local farmers. 
 
Developing countries also claim that property rights over genetic resources are 
implicitly assigned to those who have an interest in exploiting them, and the related 
biodiversity. Yet this is not necessarily the case. A developing country will not 
necessarily use the shared rent to conserve genetic resources and biodiversity, as 
experience shows.  
 
A more convincing argument is that, if the contribution of traditional knowledge in 
developing countries to the innovations is not recognized, this discourages the use and 
preservation of traditional knowledge, thus depriving the human community of the 
opportunity to make full use of the ability to decipher the informational content of   14
biodiversity which the indigenous communities and local farmers possess. (Dutfield, 
2004, pp.54-55). 
 
Another convincing argument is that when protection through patents turns the farmers 
in developing countries into providers of free raw materials,  making them totally 
dependant on suppliers from industrialized countries for basic inputs such as seeds, this 
reduces their function as potential innovators who use local genetic resources. (Shiva, 
2001). 
 
The positions of developing countries are recognized in international treaties. The 
preamble of the Biodiversity Convention affirms that states have sovereign rights on 
their own biological resources. Yet this is not an absolute right as the preamble itself 
acknowledges, specifying that the conservation of biological diversity is a common 
concern of humankind and that states are responsible for conserving their biological 
diversity and for using their biological resources in a sustainable manner.  
 
Art.15 and 19 of the Biodiversity Convention require that the results of research and the 
benefits arising from the commercial utilization of genetic resources should be shared in 
a fair and equitable way, especially with the developing countries holding the genetic 
resources used in the innovation process.   
 
The role of traditional knowledge is recognized by the Biodiversity Convention, which 
states that each country should respect and maintain the knowledge, innovations and 
habits of local indigenous communities, whose traditional lifestyles are important for 
the safeguarding and sustainable use of biodiversity (art.8).  
 
The FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources explicitly recognizes the 
contribution by the local and indigenous communities and farmers, in particular those 
living where crop diversity originates from, to the conservation and development of 
genetic resources (art.9). National governments should take steps to protect and promote 
the rights of farmers, including the protection of their traditional knowledge and the   15
right to participate at an equal level in the benefits derived from the use of genetic 
resources. 
 
The FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources also considers the above 
mentioned multilateral system as an instrument whose function it is to distribute in a 
fair way the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources (art.10). Those 
who commercialize genetic material received from the multilateral system must pay a 
sum to be defined by the system's governing body as a fair share of the benefits from 
commercialization (art.13). 
 
Problems arise because it is often difficult to find any objective criteria to establish how 
benefits should be apportioned to the countries concerned.  As an example, consider the 
following case. Big profits have been obtained by Eli Lilly from two anti-cancer 
products derived from a plant (Catharanthus Roseus) originally found in Madagascar, 
but existing throughout the tropics for long enough to be considered a native plant. 
Moreover, the ethno-biological knowledge which attracted Eli Lilly and University of 
Western Ontario researchers came not from Madagascar but from rural communities in 
the Philippines and Jamaica (Dutfield, 2004, p.47). Should benefits be assigned only to 
Madascagar? What criteria should be used in distributing and sharing benefits among 
different countries?  
 
The case just mentioned can be considered a typical example of a phenomenon known 
as “biopiracy”, referring to the fact that many patents have been granted for products 
deriving from genetic resources coming from developing countries, without the consent 
of the owners of the resources, or even without informing them (Martinez Alier, 2002).    
The former example also shows how difficult it is to establish primary ownership of the 
genetic resource or of related traditional knowledge.   
 
However this is sometimes possible, and in these cases the discovery of an example of 
biopiracy can be used to unmask the non-novelty of an innovation. There have been 
cases where the patent was revoked on the grounds that traditional knowledge already 
existed on the property of the patented innovation (Dutfield, 2004, p.50 e p.53).   16
 
Difficulties can be encountered within a country in distributing the commercial benefits 
of a patent to individual persons on the basis of their role in utilizing traditional 
knowledge, as such knowledge is normally considered common heritage of public 
domain to which everybody has free access. This argument is also used against the use 
of traditional knowledge as a factor determining the distribution of the benefits of patent 
commercialization. The argument goes as follows: if traditional knowledge is public 
domain within the borders of a country, there is no reason why the same should not 
apply outside the country’s borders (Stenson and Gray, 1997). However, this argument 
ignores the fact that traditional knowledge fell into public domain owing to abuses of 
human rights towards indigenous people who were denied and deprived of individual 
rights to their knowledge without any prior consent (Dutfield, 2004, p.58).  
 
The fact that the right of developing countries to share the benefits of biotechnological 
innovation is acknowledged in international agreements is important, but it is only a 
necessary condition for enforcing such a right. Reforms are first of all required in 
intellectual property laws and in the regulatory systems of developed countries.  
 
Many negative effects of patents in terms of excessive exploitation of traditional 
knowledge could be avoided by introducing more rigorous procedures to screen patent 
applications into the intellectual property laws of advanced countries. Any application 
should be required to explicitly take into account the pre-existing knowledge on which 
the patentable innovation might be based. 
 
We must always be aware of the strategic aspects which can lead individual countries to 
delay such reforms because of the fear of losing an advantageous position in the 
international market. Only a strong awareness of the social benefits of reforms in 
countries or groups of countries whose key role in biotechnology is internationally 
acknowledged, can change the status quo. Such awareness can be achieved through the 
pressure of public opinion in individual countries and on a global level. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Biotechnology is a sector of technological progress destined to become ever more 
important for the future of mankind. However, it is a new technology whose uncertain 
future effects can have a positive or negative sign, depending on the type of innovation 
considered. 
 
The uncertainties of the degree and timing of social costs and benefits deriving from 
biotechnological innovations require particular attention to be given to the use of 
traditional tools for providing incentives for these innovations, and in particular the 
protection of intellectual property, for example patents for new inventions. Blocking 
patentability tout court is not an appropriate solution and may indeed be 
counterproductive. It is preferable to act on reforming patenting procedures. It is very 
important to consider that granting a patent does not automatically grant authorization 
to use the patented invention; and that in any case, the procedure for obtaining a patent 
guarantees an element of transparency. However, it cannot be denied that a patent as 
such tends to promote the innovation and is therefore a tool which, by its very nature, 
highlights the benefits rather than the costs of the innovation itself. The most expedient 
approach is to perfect the patenting procedures as much as possible, and to accompany 
them with provisions for legal liability and with a better functioning of antitrust rules. 
 
In international treaties and in particular in the Biodiversity Convention, the focus is on 
the need to discourage biopiracy and to encourage developing countries that own the 
genetic resources to participate in research and share the benefits of biotechnological 
innovations, both in terms of participating in returns from the innovation allowed by the 
intellectual property rights and in terms of the use of the innovation itself for the 
purpose of their  development. This is no easy task. Developed countries should feel 
responsible for the enforcement of the principles enshrined in international treaties by 
adjusting their own legislation on intellectual property rights and on antitrust, so as to 
prevent protection of property rights from leading to an underestimation of the social 
costs of  innovations and to excessive exclusion rights and market power. 
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